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TRIBAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY:
OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES FOR A
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY*
Frank Pommershein"
Force makes a thing of its victims. There where someone
stood a moment ago, stands no one.'
- Simone Weil
I. INTRODUCTION
Tribal courts have become an increasingly prominent strand
in the braid of Indian law scholarship and practice. A central
part of this prominence relates to the developing role of tribal
courts as a touchstone of tribal sovereignty and guardian of trib-
al tradition and custom, as well as their growing contribution to
rendering justice and fair play in Indian country. This new found
ascendancy has also raised seminal and provocative questions
about the relationship, both practically and constitutionally, of
tribal courts to federal courts.
The focus of my talk is not on the exciting and important
things that tribal courts actually do,2 which is the topic of the
* This article was delivered as a keynote address at the Ninth Circuit
Judicial Conference at Sun Valley, Idaho on August 22, 1996. It has been slightly
reworked and extended for publication.
** Professor of Law, University of South Dakota School of Law.
1. Simone Weil, The Iliad: Poem of Force, in Alfred Kazin, A Genius of the
Spiritual Life, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS 20, April 18, 1996.
2. See, e.g., FRANK POMMERSHEIM, BRAID OF FEATHERS (1994) [hereinafter
POMMERSHEIM, BRAID]; Douglas B. L. Endreson, The Challenges Facing Tribal Courts
Today, 79 JUDICATURE 142 (1995); Gloria Valencia-Weber, Tribal Courts: Custom and
Innovative Law, 24 N.M. L. REv. 225 (1994); Honorable Robert Yazzie, Life Comes
From It: Navajo Justice Concepts, 24 N.M. L. REv. 175 (1994).
1
Pommersheim: Tribal Courts and the Federal Judiciary
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1997
3 MONTANA LAW REVIEW
impressive panel that follows my presentation and includes such
distinguished tribal judges as the Honorable Carey Vicenti of the
Jicarilla Apache Tribal Court and the Honorable Mary Wynne of
the Colville Tribal Court, as well as Judge William Canby of the
Ninth Circuit. My remarks instead center on the more troubling
and nettling questions concerning the structural relationship or
"fit" of tribal courts within the federal system. Questions that
are nowhere fully addressed, much less answered, in the United
States Constitution.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
Two major concerns dominate the structure of the United
States Constitution: they are the allocation of governmental
authority between the federal and state sovereigns and the dis-
tribution of federal authority within the executive, legislative,
and judicial branches of government. These themes are often de-
scribed by the terms federalism and the separation of powers.4
The constitutional objective in these areas is not only to identify
the respective zones of authority, but to set boundaries and de-
lineate structural relationships between the federal and state
sovereigns as well as among the three branches of the federal
government.
Despite the pervasiveness of these concerns in the Constitu-
tion, a third sovereign-namely the tribal sovereign-is also
present in the Constitution, albeit at the margins and often
(partially) hidden from view. The tribal sovereign is explicitly
referred to in the Indian commerce clause5 and implicitly recog-
nized in the treaty making power.' It is identified as a signifi-
3. There are also significant federal practice questions in such areas as ab-
stention and diversity, supplemental, and removal jurisdiction that are of growing
impact yet remain largely unexplored in the tribal courts-federal courts context. See,
e.g., Frank Pommersheim, Tribal Courts and Federal Courts: An Introductory Primer,
(forthcoming) (manuscript on file with the author).
4. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 1.5 (2d ed. 1994).
5. The Indian commerce clause provides: "The Congress shall have Power ...
To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with
the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
6. The Treaty making clause provides: "He [the President] shall have Power,
by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate to make Treaties. " U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
The Constitution also states that "all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land."
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
The Federal Government entered into over four hundred fifty treaties with
Indian tribes. See, e.g., CHARLES J. KAPPLER, INDIAN AFFAIRS: LAWS AND TREATIES
[Vol. 58314
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cant and real sovereign, but largely as a sovereign outside the
national and state systems.7 Needless to say, the Constitution
does not textually describe any specific relationship of the tribal
sovereign to the federal or state sovereign. As the Supreme
Court noted early on: "the relation of the Indians to the United
States is marked by peculiar and cardinal distinctions which
exist nowhere else."8
This early configuration was confronted and parsed by the
United States Supreme Court in the Marshall trilogy.9 In the
Marshall trilogy, the Supreme Court, under the leadership of
Chief Justice Marshall, set out to answer some basic Indian law
questions not easily resolved by reference to the text or history of
the Constitution. In Johnson v. McIntosh,'0 the Court delineat-
ed the broad contours of tribal property rights as being unique,
immune from state interference, but generally subject to federal
supervision and control.1' While the decision did find a superior
title in the federal government in accordance with the "doctrine
of discovery," it also recognized the authority of tribes to transfer
title (without federal approval) with the important caveat that
purchasers of tribal title could not enforce their title in the
courts of the United States.' Whether one regards Johnson as
an inevitable, practical accommodation to political exigencies in
the young republic or racist to the core, 3 it clearly kept the
(1904).
7. Individual Indians were not citizens (identified as "Indians not taxed" in the
Constitution) and therefore tribes were wholly made up of individuals who were
neither federal nor state citizens. They could not and did not participate in state or
federal government. As a result, Indians and tribes had no representation in Con-
gress. All Indians became United States citizens pursuant to the Citizenship Act of
1924. See 8 U.S.C. § 1401 (1997) (originally enacted as Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 233,
43 Stat. 253). It is generally assumed that this statute coupled with the Fourteenth
Amendment was also sufficient to make individual Indians state citizens.
8. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16 (1831).
9. The Marshall trilogy consists of Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat)
543 (1823); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); and Worcester v.
Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
10. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 543 (1823).
11. See Johnson, 21 U.S. at 573-574. The Court specifically demurred to the
applicability of natural law or, "natural right" principles that would have prevented
such a decision in favor of the "discoverers." Id.
12. See id. at 603.
13. One reading of Johnson and the Marshall trilogy as a whole suggests a
credible, perhaps even valiant, attempt to stave off an even more vicious colonialism
brewing in the other branches of the federal government and the population at large.
I myself have endorsed this reading. See POMMERSHEIM, BRAID, supra note 2, at 40-
43; see also Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism,
Constitutionalism, and Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 381
1997] 315
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tribal interest marginalized within the larger society and with-
out fully articulated constitutional status.
In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia4 and Worcester v. Geor-
gia,15 the Court nullified any claim by the states to have au-
thority over matters occurring in Indian country. This was so be-
cause as the Court opined there was a unique and exclusive
tribal-federal relationship grounded in treaties, tribal sovereign-
ty, and the Indian commerce clause and because tribes were
geographically distinct and otherwise outside the common poli-
ty."6 The Court also discerned a relationship of dependence de-
scribed in the "guardian-ward" analogy as additional grounds for
a unique, exclusive tribal-federal relationship. 7 This description
(1993). Yet, it is also clear that Marshall and the Court refused to follow their own
natural law predilections that would have required a finding of full (property) rights
in indigenous people, and consequently they set a trajectory of discrimination and
animus we have yet to fully recover from. See G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL
COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE 1815-1835, 680-682 (1991).
The Court's formulation in this regard is a quite impeachable tautology:
However extravagant the pretension of converting the discovery of an
inhabited country into conquest may appear; if the principle has been as-
serted in the first instance, and afterwards sustained; if a country has been
acquired and held under it; if the property of the great mass of the commu-
nity originates in it, it becomes the law of the land, and cannot be ques-
tioned.... However this restriction may be opposed to natural right, and
to the usages of civilized nations, yet, if it be indispensable to that system
under which the country has been settled, and be adapted to the actual
condition of the two people, it may; perhaps, be supported by reason, and
certainly cannot be rejected by Courts of justice.
Johnson, 21 U.S. at 591-592.
14. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
15. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
16. Specifically, the Court described Indian tribes as "domestic dependent na-
tions," Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17, and "distinct independent political commu-
nities," Worcester, 31 U.S. at 559. Despite these results, Congress moved expeditious-
ly to skewer this legal reality with its removal legislation, which resulted in the
enforced relocation of most of the Five Civilized Tribes then residing in the south-
eastern part of the United States to lands west of the Mississippi in Indian territory
and effectively cleared the way for unimpeded non-Indian settlement and state con-
trol. See, e.g., FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE FORMATWVE
YEARS: INDIAN TRADE AND INTERCOURSE ACTS 1790-1834, 224-48 (1962).
17. Specifically, the Court said:
Though the Indians are acknowledged to have an unquestionable, and,
heretofore, unquestioned right to the lands they occupy, until that right
shall be extinguished by a voluntary cession to our government; yet it may
well be doubted whether those tribes which reside within the acknowledged
boundaries of the United States can, with strict accuracy, be denominated
foreign nations. They may, more correctly, perhaps, be denominated domes-
tic dependent nations. They occupy a territory to which we assert a title
independent of their will, which must take effect in point of possession
when their right of possession ceases. Meanwhile they are in a state of
pupilage. Their relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to
4
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of physical and legal reality became increasingly strained in the
latter part of the nineteenth century as the result of significant
political and historical changes.
The Marshall trilogy also sought to achieve objectives be-
yond resolution of the particulars of these cases. These included
a blend of establishing federal dominance in Indian affairs, cre-
ating order and pragmatism in Indian land transfers, and dem-
onstrating some sense of moral concern for Indians. i" For most
purposes, the element of federal supremacy is key. Tribes were
seldom seen as partners or mutually equal sovereigns. Federal
supremacy was always a necessary and unalterable given.
Yet the Marshall trilogy-considerations of realpolitik
aside-is also subject to a more parsimonious reading. This read-
ing is grounded in an understanding of treaties as a cession of
some rights to the federal government (e.g., the ability to deal
directly with the states) in exchange for federal protection from
state encroachment with all other sovereign rights unim-
paired.19 In this view, the Marshall trilogy stands for three
principles: recognition of tribal sovereignty and self government,
creation of a unique tribal-federal relationship, and exclusion of
his guardian.
Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17.
18. See DAVID GETCHES ET AL., FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 78 (3rd ed. 1993). As
noted, these objectives were achieved at the cost of denying tribes and indigenous
people full and equal participation in American society and its legal system. See
supra notes 9-17 and accompanying text.
19. See, e.g., United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905) (holding that
treaties are grants of power from tribes to the U.S. Government with retention of all
powers not ceded). See also RUSSELL BARSH & J. YOUNGBLOOD HENDERSON, THE
ROAD: INDIAN TRIBES AND POLITICAL LIBERTY 270-89 (1980) for a discussion of this
means of treaty interpretation as providing a basis for the doctrine of treaty feder-
alism in which treaties are primarily understood as political compacts between tribes
and the federal government. Political compacts designed to transfer tribal authority
to deal with the states to the federal government in exchange for protection from
state encroachment and the guarantee of self government.
Such an interpretation was recently confirmed in Seminole Tribe of Florida v.
Florida, in a slightly different context where the Court noted:
If anything, the Indian Commerce Clause accomplishes a greater transfer of
power from the states to the Federal Government then does the Interstate
Commerce Clause. This is clear enough from the fact that states still exer-
cise some authority over interstate trade but have been divested of virtually
all authority over Indian commerce and Indian tribes.
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1126 (1996); see also
McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Commission, 411 U.S. 164, 172 n.7 (1973). The Court
observed that "the source of federal authority over Indian matters has been the sub-
ject of some confusion, but it is now generally recognized that the power derives
from the federal responsibility for regulating commerce with Indian tribes and for
treaty making." Id.
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state authority in Indian affairs. Obviously, these principles have
often been bent and twisted in order to serve national objectives
ranging from removal to allotment and assimilation and on to
termination, but these unprincipled excesses do not detract from
the validity of the core teachings. In fact, these teachings press
for renewed effort to narrow the distance-sometimes a
chasm-between limiting legal principles in Indian law and
federal political reality in Indian affairs.
III. NINETEENTH CENTURY CHANGES
During the nineteenth century-particularly toward its
close-a series of political, historical, and even physical changes
made the original configuration sketched in the Constitution and
explicated in the Marshall trilogy an increasingly inaccurate
description and assessment of the tribal sovereign. The comple-
tion of western expansion, the end of the treaty making process
in 1871,20 and the resulting loss of tribal governmental power 2
greatly changed the political and social reality inhabited by the
tribal sovereign.
The allotment process which began to fully emerge during
this time also dramatically changed the physical landscape in
Indian country by encouraging significant numbers of non-Indi-
ans to become permanent, property owning residents on the
reservation.22 This disastrous process made it increasingly un-
tenable to see Indian country as an area physically and legally
separate and apart from the rest of the national republic and
polity.
"Manifest destiny" surrounded Indian country and the allot-
ment process penetrated Indian country. More and more non-
Indians (and non-Indian entities like states and counties) perme-
20. See 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1996) (originally enacted as Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch.
120, § 1, 16 Stat. 566).
21. See, e.g., POMMERSHEIM, BRAID, supra note 2, at 21-23.
22. This process began with the Dawes Severalty Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-58
(1997), which was also known as the General Allotment Act of 1887 and had as its
principal goal the breakup of the tribal tradition of communal ownership through the
means of providing individual Indians with specific allotments ranging from 80 to
160 acres. The objective was to convert Indians into individual farmers and ranchers
and thereby make them readily assimilable into the surrounding non-Indian farming
and ranching communities. The policy failed dismally, resulting mainly in the reduc-
tion of the nationwide Indian land base from 138 million acres in 1887 to 48 million
acres in 1934. For an expanded description, see generally D.S. OTIS, THE DAwES ACT
AND ALLOTMENT OF INDIAN LANDS (Francis Paul Prucha ed., 1973), and
POMMERSHEIM, BRAID, supra note 2, at 221 n.15.
318 [Vol. 58
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ated the landscape in and around Indian country. These physical
processes and the attendant political changes made it increasing-
ly difficult to view Indian country and tribal sovereignty as
something "out there" without any role or impact within the
daily political and legal life of the nation. The tribal sover-
eign-considerably weakened-was no longer really outside the
national polity, but had been absorbed practically, politically,
and even physically into the republic. All of this was effectuated
without tribal consent and without any statutory or constitution-
al authorization or recognition. This seismic historical change,
complete with extensive political and social ramifications, did not
even create the slightest legal ripple at the time.
The third sovereign--originally understood as being largely
outside of, and marginal to, the young republic and poised at the
very edge of the U.S. Constitution-was fully incorporated into
the national republic without the slightest constitutional recogni-
tion or adjustment." It appears like a fait accompli. Yet, this
constitutional sleepwalking ultimately had to be confronted. And
it is my view that this legal reckoning occurred in the 1903 case
of Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock.2 Ironically, the opinion in Lone Wolf
made no mention of this constitutional problem, but blithely
went about filling the doctrinal gap created by the movement of
history and changed circumstances. This doctrinal gap was the
gap created by the perceived inability of treaties and the Indian
commerce clause to guarantee enough federal authority to deal
with a tribal sovereign inside (not outside) the republic and with-
in whose borders there was a significant number of non-Indians
and natural resources (including the land itself) of continuing in-
terest and concern to the federal government.
The basic question in Lone Wolf was whether Congress could
unilaterally abrogate treaties-here the 1867 Treaty between the
Kiowa, Comanches, and Apaches and the federal government. 5
The question presented itself in the context of the "need" for
federal acquisition of more Indian land in the absence of treaty
making or forcible appropriation. The Court readily answered in
the affirmative.2" The doctrinal justification for this extensive
authority was the plenary power doctrine.27 The Court de-
23. Indian people, recall, were not yet United States or state citizens. See supra
note 7 and accompanying text.
24. 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
25. See Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 554, 560-62.
26. See id. at 568.
27. See id. at 565-66.
1997] 319
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scribed the doctrine in these terms: "Plenary authority over the
tribal relations of the Indians has been exercised by Congress
from the beginning, and the power has always been deemed a
political one, not subject to be controlled by the judicial depart-
ment of the government."'
The plenary power doctrine-without any constitutional
mooring-ratified the absorption of Indian tribes physically and
politically into the national republic and assigned complete au-
thority over this third sovereign to the United States Congress.
All of this was accomplished by extraordinary constitutional eva-
siveness.29 In other words, the "need" for ongoing federal hege-
mony trumped any concern or necessity for constitutional integ-
rity. The brutal effect of Lone Wolf was both to strip tribes of
their constitutional status and to make their sovereignty subject
to the unconstrained (and extra-constitutional) authority of the
federal government.
Yet the plenary power doctrine-at least at that
time-established a "workable" structural (if not constitutional)
relationship between the federal and tribal sovereigns. It was, in
fact, remarkably simple. Congress had all the power (not even
subject to judicial review),3' and the tribes possessed only that
28. Id. at 565. The decision in Lone Wolf quotes and builds on the bold asser-
tion in United States v. Kagama:
The power of the General Government over these remnants of a race
once powerful, now weak and diminished in numbers, is necessary to their
protection, as well as to the safety of those among whom they dwell. It
must exist in that government, because it never has existed anywhere else,
because the theatre of its exercise is within the geographical limits of the
United Sates, because it has never been denied, and because it alone can
enforce its laws on all the tribes.
United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384-85 (1886). This assertion is not one of
constitutional principles, but of an expedient tautology. Someone has to have com-
plete power over Indian tribes (why?) and it has to be the Federal Government be-
cause it has always been so (why?).
29. The opinion in Lone Wolf makes no attempt to justify its ruling on consti-
tutional grounds. See also POMMERSHEIM, BRAID, supra note 2, at 47. Note specifical-
ly: "As suggested by Professor Robert Clinton: 'In Lockean social compact terms,
Indian tribes never entered into or consented to any constitutional social contract by
which they agreed to be governed by federal or state authority, rather than by tribal
sovereignty." Id. at 48 (quoting Robert N. Clinton, Tribal Courts and the Federal
Union, 26 WILLAMETrE L. REv. 841, 847 (1990) [hereinafter Clinton, Tribal Courts]).
30. See Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 565. The non-judicial reviewability element (as a
political question) has subsequently been modified by such cases as Delaware Tribal
Business Committee v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73 (1977), and United States v. Sioux Na-
tion, 448 U.S. 371 (1980) (authorizing judicial review of congressional action in Indi-
an affairs in accordance with the "rational basis" standard, a standard, incidentally,
that the Supreme Court has rarely found Congress unable to satisfy). See., e.g.,
POMMERSHEIM, BRAID, supra note 2, at 47.
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authority not extinguished by Congress. In other words, tribal
authority hinged on congressional sufferance rather than any
constitutional principles or recognition of durable tribal sover-
eignty. This extensive congressional authority itself could not be
traced to any constitutional provisions. Such a legal regime was
(and is) clearly at odds with any Lockean notion of republican
government being founded on the premise of limited authority
for limited sovereigns.31  This central axiom of federal
constitutionalism was blatantly ignored and transgressed in
Lone Wolf.
Since tribal governments in the first half of the twentieth
century remained weak in their efforts to exercise significant
governmental power, particularly power over non-Indians, the
plenary power doctrine was not challenged in any meaningful
way either practically or legally. This is not surprising. When an
(oppressed) sovereign is weak and listless, its legal and constitu-
tional status is seldom noticed or commented upon. Its low ener-
gy passes without concern or examination by the dominant sys-
tem. Yet, when a sovereign becomes more active and robust, the
issue of legal status and constitutionality often comes to the fore.
Then the question becomes whether its developmental vigor will
continue to earn a clean (constitutional) bill of health or whether
it will be deemed excessive and constitutionally impaired. This
legal diagnosis remains ongoing but without any convincing
conceptual etiology in the constitutional sense.32
IV. TRIBAL RENASCENCE (1960s-1990s)
The process of tribal government reinvigoration33 began
with the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934,' which specifically
sought to encourage the formation and development of "modern"
tribal governments.35 This process began to develop a unique
momentum by the 1960s. Beginning in the 1960s, often with fed-
eral government support and endorsement, many tribal govern-
31. See, e.g., POMMERSHEIM, BRAID, supra note 2, at 47-48.
32. See infra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
33. See POMMERSHEIM, BRAID, supra note 2, at 22-23.
34. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1994). Interestingly, the Indian Reorganization
Act comports with basic principles of treaty federalism because of its requirement of
tribal consent. See BARSH & HENDERSON, supra note 19, at 276.
35. See, e.g., Comment, Tribal Self-Government and the Indian Reorganization
Act of 1934, 70 MICH. L. REV. 955 (1972). For criticism of the Indian Reorganization
Act as being subversive of traditional tribal governments see Russell Barsh, Another
Look at Reorganization: When Will Tribes Have A Choice, INDIAN TRUTH, No. 247,
Oct. 1952, at 4-5, 10-12.
1997] 321
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ments began in earnest to ardently (re)assert the rights of self-
government and self-determination. In fact, this federal policy
period is often referred to as the period of meaningful self-deter-
mination." During this period, Congress passed key legislation
to advance and support tribal self-determination. Examples of
this legislation include the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968,"7
the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of
1978,38 the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978,"9 the Indian
Tribal Government Tax Status Act of 1982' and the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988.4'
These statutes were widely perceived in Indian country as
supporting and advancing the right of tribal self-government and
self-determination.42 While scholarly criticism of plenary power
continued, there was little direct criticism from the tribes and no
significant legal challenges to its existence.' On balance, or so
36. See, e.g., ROBERT N. CLINTON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAw 158-64 (3rd ed.
1994) [hereinafter CLINTON, AMERICAN INDIAN LAW].
37. Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 77 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-
03 (1994)).
38. Pub. L. No. 95-608, 92 Stat. 3069 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §
1901-63 (1994)).
39. Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §
450(a) (1994)).
40. Pub. L. No. 97-473, 96 Stat. 2608 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 7871
(1994)).
41. Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§
2701-21 (1994)).
42. Perhaps with the exception of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 which is
sometimes seen as invading tribal sovereignty. See, e.g., CLINTON, AMERICAN INDIAN
LAW, supra note 36, at 385-86.
43. Professor Robert Clinton has collected the sweeping scholarly criticism of
the plenary power doctrine:
The illegitimacy of federal assertions of such sweeping unilateral authority
frequently is proclaimed in Indian country. Indeed, scholars consistently
have questioned the purported doctrine of plenary federal authority over
Indians because of the lack of any textual roots -for the doctrine in the
Constitution, the breadth of its implications, and the lack of any tribal
consent to such broad federal authority. Therefore, many commentators have
sought out limits on that authority. E.g., Milner S. Ball, Constitution, Court,
Indian Tribes, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 1 (suggesting lack of textual
authority for plenary power); R. BARSH & J. HENDERSON, THE ROAD: INDIAN
TRIBES AND POLITICAL LIBERTY 257-69 (1980) (suggesting limitations derived
from article 1 and the ninth amendment); Robert Clinton, Isolated in Their
Own Country: A Defense of Federal Protection of Indian Autonomy and Self-
Government, 33 STAN. L. REv. 979, 996-1001 (1981) (suggesting inherent
limits in the reach of the Indian commerce clause); Richard B. Collins,
Indian Consent to American Government, 31 ARIZ. L. REv. 365 (1989) (argu-
ing for Indian consent as a limitation on federal authority); Robert T.
Coulter, The Denial of Legal Remedies to Indian Nations Under U.S. Law,
in NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD COMMITTEE ON NATIVE AMERICAN STRUGGLES,
10
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it seemed, the plenary power doctrine was being used to assist
rather than to harm tribes. And, of course, extensive power is
like that; it can be used for good or ill. However, that is not the
constitutional view of governmental power. The constitutional
view is that because of the potential for abuse, power is to be
circumscribed and subject to checks and balances"-except in
Indian affairs.' And yet, perhaps, it is possible to reconcile ple-
nary authority with such basic constitutional postulates if it is
understood that plenary power may properly be used to advance
tribal self-government and protect tribes from state encroach-
ment in Indian country, but it cannot be used to invade the le-
gitimate spheres of tribal self-government and the integrity of
tribal existence. Such a view accords with the basic concepts
embedded in the compact theory that is the foundational under-
pinning of treaty federalism." This understanding does not ap-
pear, however, to have permeated current congressional or recent
Supreme Court decision making.
Regardless of any conceptual niceties, the resurgence of a
weakened sovereign will inevitably challenge any non-constitu-
tional, doctrinal status quo. The only surprise was the unexpect-
ed source of the challenge being that created by the rapid devel-
opment of tribal courts. This forward movement of tribal courts
was not fueled by any piece of federal legislation, but rather by
local efforts that culminated in several cases being decided by
the United States Supreme Court. These cases include Santa
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,47 National Farmers Union Insurance
Co. v. Crow Tribe of Indians" and Iowa Mutual Insurance Co.
v. LaPlante.'4
The rise of tribal courts owes much to both these key Su-
RETHINKING INDIAN LAW 103, 106 (1982) ("[Tlhere is not textual support in
the Constitution for the proposition that Congress has plenary authority
over Indian nations"); Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power over Indians: Its
Sources Scope and Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 195, 261-67 (1984) (sug-
gesting due process and takings limitations).
Clinton, Tribal Courts, supra note 29, at 855-56 n.41.
44. See DAVID CRUMP, ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,
lxiii-lxiv (2d ed. 1993); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
45. See Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 564.
46. See supra notes 18-19 and infra notes 74-75 and accompanying text. As
suggested by Professor Phil Frickey, plenary power ought not be a congressional
sword used against tribes but more of a shield against state regulation of tribes. See
Frickey, supra note 13, at 395.
47. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
48. 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
49. 480 U.S. 9 (1987).
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preme Court decisions and the synergistic growth of tribal court
competence and quality of its personnel. Up to and throughout
most of the 1970s, very little, if any, significant litigation arising
on reservations was brought directly in tribal court. Indeed,
almost all of this legal activity was generally brought directly in
federal court through such jurisdictional devices as an implied
cause of action deriving from the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968,
diversity jurisdiction, or federal questions. Most litigants, both
Indian and non-Indian, apparently viewed federal courts as more
hospitable and structurally sound than tribal courts.50
Regardless of the accuracy of such perceptions, this jurisdic-
tional landscape began to change rapidly and extensively in the
late 1970s. In 1978, the Supreme Court decided the seminal case
of Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, in which a female tribal
member challenged the Santa Clara Pueblo's enrollment ordi-
nance that barred enrollment of her children which resulted
from her marriage with a non-member, but did not bar enroll-
ment of children resulting from the union of a male tribal mem-
ber with a non-member.5 In Santa Clara Pueblo, the Court
ruled that the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 did not waive
tribal sovereign immunity, did not establish an implied federal
cause of action and concluded that the only federal remedy avail-
able under the statute was the habeas relief established at 25
U.S.C. § 1303.52 The Court specifically noted that in the context
of a cause of action arising under the statute but not amenable
to habeas relief the effect of its decision was to recognize that:
Tribal forums are available to vindicate rights created by the
ICRA, and § 1302 has the substantial and intended effect of
changing the law which these forums are obliged to apply.
Tribal courts have repeatedly been recognized as appropriate
forums for the exclusive adjudication of disputes affecting im-
portant personal and property interests of both Indians and
non-Indians. 5
As a result of this wide ranging and largely unexpected
decision, tribal courts suddenly found themselves thrust into an
unexpected centrality as the sole local forum available to hear
civil rights claims against the tribe arising on the reservation.
This included the whole panoply of litigation implicating indi-
50. See POMMERSHEIM, BRAID, supra note 2, at 66-68.
51. See Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 51.
52. See id. at 69-70.
53. Id. at 65 (citations omitted).
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vidual rights in such areas as election disputes, wrongful termi-
nation, and discrimination within the context of the ICRA's due
process and equal protection guarantees. The result has been the
development of a considerable body of tribal court jurisprudence
dealing with the issues and themes of individual rights and civil
rights.'
In the mid-1980s, two additional decisions of the United
States Supreme Court further spurred the development of tribal
courts as the locus-at least in the first instance-for important
civil litigation arising on the reservation. In both National Farm-
ers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians and Iowa Mutual
Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, the Court recognized the importance of
tribal courts as the premier local forum. As Justice Marshall
wrote in the Iowa Mutual case, "[t]ribal courts play a vital role
in tribal self-government... and the Federal Government has
consistently encouraged their development."'
In National Farmers Union, a tort case originally brought in
tribal court by a Crow tribal member against a state school dis-
trict for injuries that were suffered in a motorcycle accident on
the reservation, the Court upheld tribal court jurisdiction and
established an analytical framework for challenges to tribal court
authority.56 In its decision, the Court delineated two important
principles: First, actions properly brought in tribal court are not
subject to jurisdictional attack in federal court until there is an
exhaustion of tribal remedies; and second, questions about the
permissible limits of tribal court jurisdiction are legitimate feder-
al questions under 28 U.S.C. § 1331."7
In Iowa Mutual, a Blackfoot tribal member brought a tort
action in tribal court against a Montana corporate ranch for
injuries suffered while in its employ on the reservation." Here,
the defendant insurer sought relief in federal court and invoked
federal jurisdiction pursuant to the diversity provision set out at
28 U.S.C. § 1332.5' The Supreme Court ruled that "[r]egardless
of the basis of [federal] jurisdiction, the federal policy supporting
tribal self-government directs a federal court to stay its hand in
54. See, e.g., Douglas B. L. Endreson, The Challenges Facing Tribal Courts To-
day, 79 JUDICATURE 142 (1995) (giving a comprehensive review of tribal court
decisionmaking).
55. Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. at 14-15.
56. See National Farmers Union, 471 U.S. at 845.
57. See id. at 853-54; see also Frank Pommersheim, The Crucible of Sovereignty:
Analyzing Issues of Tribal Jurisdiction, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 329, 330 (1989).
58. See Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. at 11.
59. See id. at 12-13.
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order to give the tribal court 'full opportunity to determine its
own jurisdiction."'6 ° This includes any applicable tribal appel-
late procedures.6" The Court also stated that tribal authority
over activity on reservation lands is an important part of tribal
sovereignty. Accordingly, civil jurisdiction over such activities
lies presumptively in tribal courts unless affirmatively limited by
a specific treaty or federal statute.62
V. OLD WINE IN NEW BOTTLES
Despite these progressive developments, the National Farm-
ers Union and Iowa Mutual cases raised the old question of the
extent of the federal power in Indian affairs as they confronted
the issue of assessing the extent of federal authority to deter-
mine the legitimate ambit of tribal court judicial authority. In
these particular situations, the Constitution provided no textual
guidance. In addition, since there was no federal statute on
point, the classic construct of congressional plenary power was
also unavailing. Instead of conceding that tribal sovereignty was
unimpaired in the absence of any constitutional or statutory
constraint, the Court located definitive controlling authority in
the federal common law.' The Court reached into the doctrinal-
60. Id. at 16.
61. See id at 16-17.
62. See id. at 14.
63. The Court noted that there was no claim that any provision of the Consti-
tution or any federal statute limited tribal court civil jurisdiction. Yet, it went on to
say that federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 "will support claims
founded upon federal common law as well as those of a statutory origin." National
Farmers Union, 471 U.S. at 850. The Court, however, did not cite a single precedent
relevant to tribal court jurisdiction. In fact, the cases cited involved federal statutes
or broad taxing questions. The Court, it seems to me, just assumed the authority to
decide. This is indeed quite remarkable unless one concedes a "brooding (judicial)
omnipresence" to determine whether tribes are exercising authority "inconsistent with
their dependent status."
Although the Court explicitly rejected the application of the Oliphant holding
(tribes do not have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians) on the civil side, it ap-
peared to be more hospitable to its broader assertion:
But the tribes' retained powers are not such that they are limited only by
specific restrictions in treaties or congressional enactments. As the Court of
Appeals recognized, Indian tribes are prohibited from exercising both those
powers of autonomous states that are expressly terminated by Congress and
those powers "inconsistent with their status."
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208 (1978); see also United States
v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978) which held:
Their incorporation within the territory of the United States, and their
acceptance of its protection, necessarily divested them of some aspects of
the sovereignty which they had previously exercised.
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ly questionable notion of federal common law in order to circum-
scribe the substantive boundaries of tribal court authority.
In National Farmers Union, this repository of federal com-
mon law was cited without extensive discussion and effectively
extended the plenary power doctrine beyond Congress and into
the hands of the Supreme Court as the final arbiter of tribal
court authority. In a constitutional republic premised on the
limited, enumerated authority of the national sovereign, this
appears quite surprising. In this light, National Farmers Union
takes on a potentially much darker hue. In most Indian law
scholarship, including my own, National Farmers Union is seen
as a case strongly supportive of tribal courts as demonstrated by
its requirements of exhaustion and comity.6 And this is obvi-
ously so. Yet the darker coloration is to be found in the way the
Court claimed for itself the unfettered power to determine the
substantive reach of tribal court authority.65
As a result, an inherent conflict surfaces and highlights the
tension involving the Supreme Court's arbiting, on one hand, the
scope of tribal judicial authority, while on the other hand, decid-
ing how much comity and parity that resulting authority is enti-
tled. This is decidedly not the situation in the federal-state con-
text where the Constitution itself determines the appropriate
zones of state and federal authority.' It is also well beyond
Lone Wolf which established congressional plenary power in
Indian affairs.67 Indeed, the Court failed to heed its own warn-
. . * In sum, Indian tribes still possess those aspects of sovereignty
not withdrawn by treaty or statute, or by implication as a necessary result
of their dependent status.
Because the Court in National Farmers Union (in contrast to Oliphant) did not
rule against tribal court jurisdiction (it just said it could), much remains to be decid-
ed and hangs in the balance. See infra notes 65-82 and accompanying text.
64. See POmMERSHEIM, BRAID, supra note 2, at 50.
65. See, e.g., Laurie Reynolds, Exhaustion of Tribal Remedies: Extolling Tribal
Sovereignty While Expanding Federal Jurisdiction, 73 N.C. L. REV. 1089 (1995).
Unfortunately, this darker view was confirmed by the Supreme Court in its
recent decision of Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 117 S. Ct. 1404 (1997). In this unani-
mous decision, the Court held that tribes do not have judicial or regulatory jurisdic-
tion over non-members for actions that take place on state or federal highways that
run through reservations. No federal statute commanded this result, but this did not
trouble the Court. It simply created a "bright line" rule without reference to founda-
tional principles, respect for tribal self-government, or concern for limitations on its
own authority. See also infra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
66. For example, the Tenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides: "The
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it
to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST.
amend. Y
67. See Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 565.
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ing from Santa Clara Pueblo that "Congress' authority over Indi-
an matters is extraordinarily broad; and the role of courts in
adjusting relations between and among tribes and their members
correspondingly restrained."'
From a tribal court perspective, the result in National Farm-
ers Union is helpful and endorsing, but it comes at a doctrinal
price. That price is the apparent extension of plenary power into
the judicial realm. The plenary power doctrine can now be seen
as coming in two distinct vintages. There is the classic doctrine
of congressional plenary power as established in Lone Wolf.69
Yet even if Congress has not acted-where one would normally
presuppose an unimpaired tribal sovereignty-the Court now
recognizes a judicial plenary power to parse the limits of tribal
court authority based on federal common law. A federal common
law that at least heretofore has not been equated with any no-
tion of implied divestiture of tribal authority.70
It is extremely important to emphasize that the Court itself
did not, and has not, used the term "judicial plenary power" and,
in fact, seems quite unaware of the doctrinal watershed it has
created. This makes the Court's future pronouncements in this
area all the more unpredictable and potentially harmful. Of
course, Congress can nip this judicial plenary authority in the
bud through the exercise of its own superior plenary power, but
regardless of the result, the situation only highlights the accordi-
on view of tribal sovereignty as that which can be squeezed from
federal sufferance.71 A federal sufferance expanded beyond con-
gressional plenary power to include a nascent judicial plenary
power. There are, as of yet, no constitutional moorings to hold
fast the positive aspects of deference and comity in National
Farmers Union and Iowa Mutual.
As tribal courts have become more prominent, the Court has
"discovered" a judicial plenary power grounded in federal com-
68. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 72 (citing Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 565).
This, of course, contrasts with the broader Oliphant language. See supra note 63.
There is also the unsettling distinction that Santa Clara Pueblo involved a tribe and
its members, while Oliphant involved a tribe and non-Indians. Maybe the Court
believes its jurisprudential net of concern is "properly" at its widest when non-In-
dians are involved. Yet the limiting conceptional rubric remains quite distinct:
Oliphant, "inconsistent with their dependent status"; National Farmers Union, "feder-
al common law." See supra note 63.
69. See Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 565.
70. See, e.g., Reynolds, supra note 65 and accompanying text.
71. See, e.g., Escondido Mut. Water Co. v. La Jolla Band of Mission Indians,
466 U.S. 765, 788 n.30 (1984) (holding that "all aspects of Indian sovereignty are
subject to defeasance by Congress").
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mon law to monitor the extent of tribal court judicial authority.
This extensive power has been articulated with the self-restraint
labels of exhaustion and comity. Yet these silver linings cannot
hide the dark cloud that sets the Supreme Court (and lower
federal courts) as the final arbiter of tribal court authority. With-
out a constitutional benchmark like the Tenth Amendment,72
tribal sovereignty is consistently subject to potential (judicial) de-
feasance that severely compromises any comity and parity deriv-
ing from the emerging federal-tribal judicial relationship. The
irony of National Farmers Union and Iowa Mutual is that they
require comity and deference to tribal courts at the expense of
both creating and extending judicial plenary power.
VI. CONSTITUTIONAL JOURNEY
It is necessary to maintain deference and comity-and the
wholly meritorious tenor of federal respect toward the tribal
judiciary-but without the creation of a doctrine that results in a
growth of federal judicial power over tribal courts. It seems that
what is needed is a constitutional "faith"" that recognizes the
validity of an autonomous tribal judiciary as the final arbiter of
disputes that arise on the reservation unless such matters have
been affirmatively limited by actions of Congress that are them-
selves grounded in recognizable constitutional principles." Giv-
en the current doctrinal incoherence and the limitless reach of
plenary power, the necessity for both something we might call
"plenary restraint" and constitutional dialogue in the Indian law
context seems particularly appropriate. This "faith" envisions
establishing a meaningful relationship between tribal courts and
federal courts that is, ultimately, constitutionally rooted and
provides the basis for enduring and sound development.
This constitutional "faith" is not a blind faith without histor-
ical grounding but rather is rooted in a (re)understanding that
treaties are first and foremost "political compacts"-compacts
72. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
73. 'Faith' may seem quite an odd word to use in conjunction with notions of
constitutional explication, but it strikes me as wholly appropriate in the effort to
recall and recover important foundational understandings relative to the constitution-
al status of tribal sovereignty and principles of treaty federalism.
74. There is, of course, a kind of doctrinal double bind here. While it may be
necessary to look to Congress to limit the exercise of judicial plenary power, this
must not obscure the fact that congressional plenary power itself is unrestrained and
without constitutional justification. See, e.g., supra notes 24-31 and accompanying
text. See also potential affirmative limitations on plenary power discussed supra note
46 and accompanying text.
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that provide a kind of mutual "political recognition and a mea-
sure of the consensual distribution of powers between tribes and
the United States.""5 This recognition was once approved in
such cases as Worcester v. Georgia,76 United States v. Winans,77
and even the Indian Commerce Clause itself and contains (now
as it did then) the seeds to (re)establish an appropriate legal and
political paradigm for a dignified and principled model of federal-
tribal relations. Since this paradigm was never adequately rec-
ognized, much less constitutionalized, it is not surprising that
federal dominance in Indian affairs has increasingly become
untethered from any limiting legal principles and evermore char-
acterized by a doctrinal incoherence bordering on conceptual and
historical illiteracy.78
The point of this constitutional "faith" is to identify a fruitful
path in the evolving relationship of tribal courts and federal
courts. This path begins in the past with an understanding of
mutuality grounded in principles of treaty federalism, then
moves to sweep aside the plenary brambles, and finally clears
the way to complete a constitutional journey. In other words,
this emerging "faith" seeks a way that respects both the aspira-
tions of tribal courts to flourish and a national jurisprudence
that regards arbitrary power as constitutionally indefensible.
Without such "faith" and conscientious effort, there is little hope
for meaningful growth and stability but only the likelihood of a
kind of blind and erratic development that potentially exposes
tribal courts (and tribes in general) to the "decisive operations of
merciless power."" The presence of such a "faith" is needed to
provide both confident institutional grounding and principled
75. BARSH & HENDERSON, supra note 19, at 270.
76. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 575 (1832).
77. 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
78. See POMMERSHEIM, BRAID, supra note 2, at 46-48. There is also the more
decorous observation that "the precedential effect of federal Indian law decisions is
often weak." Frickey, supra note 13, at 439.
See also David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New
Subjectivism of the Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 CAL. L. REv. 1573 (1996), for a
trenchant analysis of the Court's abandonment of foundation principles in favor of a
new subjectivism. This subjectivism was candidly described by Justice Scalia:
[Olpinions in this field have not posited an original state of affairs that can
subsequently be altered only by explicit legislation, but have rather sought
to discern what the current state of affairs ought to be by taking into ac-
count all legislation, and the congressional "expectations" that it reflects,
down to the present day.
Id. at 1575.
79. Tacitus, quoted in SEAMUS HEANEY, CREDITING POETRY 27 (1996).
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constitutional assurance.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The terrain I have discussed has few markers except those
of National Farmers Union and Iowa Mutual."0 The unambigu-
ous message of these cases is the directive to support the devel-
opment of tribal courts. I think this means-must mean-despite
the absence of extensive judicial elaboration-assisting tribal
courts in obtaining continuing respect, creating stable structural
relationships with federal courts, and achieving parity with state
and federal courts within our national judicial system. All of this
needs to be pursued and explored within a yet to be adequately
identified constitutional framework-a constitutional framework
that nevertheless can be discerned within principles of treaty
federalism.81 There are also the less visible but co-ordinate
parts of this equation that involve the range and extent of tribal
judicial power over non-Indians and events that take place on fee
land within the reservation. 2 All of these concerns are current-
ly unhinged from any meaningful constitutional idiom or dis-
course and threaten to permanently extend the plenary power
doctrine into the judicial realm. The sum of these developments
80. Note, however, that this terrain has been severely disturbed by the Court's
recent decision in A-1 Contractors, 117 S. Ct. 1404. See supra note 65 and infra note
82 and accompanying text.
81. See BARSH & HENDERSON, supra note 19, at 279-82.
82. See, e.g., Duncan Energy Co. v. Three Affiliated Tribes, 27 F.3d 1294 (8th
Cir. 1994); FMC v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 905 F.2d 1311 (9th Cir. 1990); Strate
v. A-i Contractors, 117 S. Ct. 1404 (1997).
The A-1 Contractors case is almost paradigmatic. There was a car accident on
the Fort Berthold Reservation in North Dakota. It took place on a state highway
constructed on a right of way granted by the tribe and involved .two non-Indians.
There are no controlling federal statutes on point. The sole issue in the case is
whether the tribal court has proper jurisdiction over this garden variety tort action.
In the absence of any limiting federal statutes, one would assume an unimpaired
tribal sovereignty. Yet, the assertion of federal common law may indiscriminately
swallow the modest tribal authority claimed in this arena. It is difficult to see how
the Court could rule against tribal court jurisdiction unless it relied on such unprin-
cipled declarations as "inconsistent with their status" or misguided attempts to ex-
pand Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981), beyond its statutory. underpin-
nings. See, e.g., Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 76 F.3d 930 (8th Cir. 1996) using this
very approach. But see Matter of the Estate of Tasunke Witko v. G. Heileman Brew-
ing, Civ. 93-204 (Rosebud Sioux Supreme Court 1996), for a contrary exegesis. (Note
in this regard that the author is a member of the Rosebud Sioux Supreme Court.)
Yet, as noted above, supra note 65 and accompanying text, this is exactly
what the Supreme Court did. The Court's decision highlights its ongoing amnesia in
the Indian law arena and reinforces the necessity to return to foundational principles
and to identify a constitutional grounding for the future.
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reveals a journey-though seldom recognized---of great consti-
tutional and historical import that needs the increased under-
standing and engagement of all of us within the legal communi-
ty. Without this consciousness and commitment, there is only
likely to be more aimless wandering in an (extra) constitutional
wilderness.
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